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Incentives, regulations and other policy interventions intended to promote 
sustainability work through influencing human behaviour.  There is therefore much to 
be gained from a thorough understanding of exactly how various policy interventions 
relate to the decision-making process.  Experimental economics, and the closely 
related fields of behavioural economics and behavioural finance, apply an empirical 
approach to study how people act when faced with a range of economic and social 
scenarios.  The experimental approach was pioneered by Vernon Smith and 
Daniel Kahneman and others, building on early studies by Chamberlin (1948).  In 
recognition of this work, Kahneman and Smith were awarded the 2002 Nobel Prize 
in Economic Sciences. This paper briefly reviews the applications and methods of 
experimental economics, relates some key research findings and describes some 
examples of its use in informing environmental policy.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Economics describes how individuals and communities make choices regarding 
scarce resources.  Economic theory makes many assumptions about how people 
respond in any given situation, typically modelling decision-makers as completely 
rational, self-interested agents.  Economic experiments focus on real, rather than 
assumed, behaviour, incorporating some of the psychological and behavioural 
factors that influence economic decisions.  Experiments can reveal the intricacies of 
human behaviour in markets, showing how apparently minor details of market design 
can lead to significant differences in outcomes.  Experiments also test how people 
respond in non-market situations, such as when faced with a trade-off between self 
interest and the collective good (as is common in many environmental dilemmas).  
Economic experiments can serve a number of purposes.  Firstly, they can be 
used as a tool to develop and refine economic theory.  For example, experiments 
show how markets work, with the competitive environment prompting individual 
traders to reveal their marginal costs and values (even though each would prefer to 
get a more favourable price).  The assumption in neoclassical economics that people 
have full information has been shown to be unnecessary – all that is required for 
markets to reach equilibrium is for traders to know their own costs and values 
(Smith, 1994).  Experiments also show that, in a broad range of circumstances, 
people do not always act in ways that maximise their financial self-interest.   
Motivations such as altruism, fairness and self image are important in decision-
making; the experimental approach is facilitating the incorporation of such 
preferences into economic theory (eg. Gintis, 2000; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002). 
Secondly, experiments are used to inform policy design.  Economic theory is 
not sufficiently developed to describe every policy scenario, and applying it can 
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require information that is not always available (McMillan, 1994).  Proposed policies 
and incentive mechanisms can be exposed to human decision makers in the 
laboratory, which may reveal any flaws or unanticipated outcomes.  Policy 
prototypes can be tested experimentally in a simplified laboratory environment; if it 
doesn’t work as anticipated here then it is very likely to fail in a field application 
(Plott, 1997).  In the absence of a developed discipline of ‘policy engineering’, 
capable of predicting performance with a similar level of forensic certainty as that 
expected from civil engineers, the use of experimental economics techniques to test 
performance prior to implementation should be an important part of the policy 
maker’s toolkit.  Experiments also allow alternative policies to be directly compared 
under controlled conditions, providing an empirical basis to policy selection.  This 
can be done with a range of different parameters, to indicate how each alternative 
might perform under various scenarios.  
Thirdly, economic experiments provide an opportunity to reveal and measure 
some of the social norms that underlie human societies (Camerer and Fehr, 2004). 
Simple experiments can shed light on how people trade-off individual and collective 
interest, how they cooperate and compete with others, and how such behaviour 
varies between individuals and settings.  While market behaviour appears similar 
across developed societies, there is some evidence that cultural differences affect 
individual bargaining behaviour (Roth et al., 1991).  A recent study applied 
experiments to compare behaviour among members of traditional societies from 
around the world, revealing substantial variation, some of which could be related to 
differences in societal structures (Henrich et al., 2001).  Experiments can also be 
used to test for different norms within different sub-groups of society (eg. McAllister 
and Reeson, 2007).  
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METHODS 
Control is the key to experimentation.  An ideal experiment will have a single 
variable, while all other factors are held constant.  This allows the effects of the 
variable of interest to be disentangled from everything else.  The experimental 
scenario should be as simple as possible, yet with enough detail to address the 
research question.  The key features of a market or interaction need to be simulated, 
while minimising all extraneous factors.  The use of computers allows a greater 
degree of control, as the instructions and interface can be exactly replicated in 
different sessions.  Computers also facilitate anonymity and allow complex, real-time 
trades and interactions. 
In Smith’s early market experiments, participants were told only that they were 
trading ‘units’, and that they were a buyer or a seller (Smith, 1962).  Therefore 
participants’ actions were controlled to a considerable level.  All they could choose 
was if, and at what price, to trade.  This was all that was necessary to test Smith’s 
hypothesis, and avoided the complications that might occur if people tried doing 
other things.  However this control comes at the expense of realism.  In most real 
markets, people’s actions are far less constrained, and so behaviour may differ from 
that observed in the laboratory.  At the other extreme, there is growing interest in 
field experiments, in which behaviour is measured under far more realistic settings, 
but usually at the expense of some degree of control (see Harrison and List, 2004).  
Of course not all variables can be completely controlled.  The most obvious of 
these is the human factor – the basis of experimental economics is that it observes 
real human decision-making, and since no two individuals are exactly the same, 
there will always be differences between experiments.  One way around this might 
be to use the same individuals when testing alternative institutions. However they 
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would still not be identical – people’s behaviour in the second institution is likely to be 
influenced by their experience in the first.  Therefore one could not be sure whether 
any observed differences were due to different institutions or different levels of 
experience.  
Economic experiments should use fresh participants in each session, to avoid 
these confounding effects of learning and experience.  Each group is considered as 
a random sample of the population.  To establish that observed differences are down 
to the experimental treatments being tested, rather than just random differences 
between groups of people, requires replication – each experimental institution must 
be run several times, with a different group each time.  Statistical analysis can then 
indicate whether there are significant differences between the treatments, as 
opposed to random differences between groups of people.  
A key feature of economic experiments is that participants are rewarded 
based on their decisions.  This means that, for them, the values they are assigned 
become real, and any transactions have a real value.  The way in which this is done 
is critical to the experimental design, since the induced values must match the 
economic system under investigation if realistic behaviour is to be observed 
(Smith,1976). There are four key components of experimental payments (Smith, 
1982): 
1.  Non-satiation – the concept of induced value depends upon non-satiation.  
Given a costless choice between two alternatives, identical except that the 
first yields more of the reward medium (eg. cash) than the second, the first will 
always be chosen over the second by an autonomous individual.  This could 
be violated for example if the experiment included some people of great 
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2.  Saliency – individuals participating in the experiment should be guaranteed a 
reward that increases with good outcomes (or decreases with bad outcomes). 
Thus an experiment in which participants are paid in proportion to their profits 
during the experiment would be salient, whist an experiment where all 
participants are paid a flat fee regardless of performance would not. 
3.  Dominance – the reward structure should dominate any subjective costs (or 
values) associated with participation in the activities of the experiment.  This 
requires that the payoff levels are judged to be high for the participant 
population being considered. 
4.  Privacy – each subject in an experiment is given information only on his/her 
own payoff alternatives.  This is because privacy is a pervasive characteristic 
(in varying degrees) of virtually all market institutions in the field. 
Ideally every decision made should potentially have financial consequences 
for participants.  Some experiments get around this by choosing one particular 
decision at random and paying participants based on that.  Provided it is not known 
is advance which decisions will be the basis of the payments, the incentive is still 
salient.  It is better to pay all participants based on performance than award prizes to 
the most successful, as this will encourage risk taking behaviour that would not 
necessarily be seen outside of the experiment, and salience will be lost as 
participants consider they no longer have a chance of winning.  
Most economic experiments use university students as participants.  This is 
mainly for practical reasons, as most research to date has been carried out within 
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universities, so student populations have been the natural recruiting ground.   
Students are also more likely to be available during the day, and smaller amounts of 
money can be salient.  However there is no reason for experiments to be limited to 
student participants, and some studies have deliberately targeted other groups such 
as CEOs (Fehr and List, 2004) and farmers (Ward, 2005).  Empirical studies indicate 
that the demographics of participants have surprisingly little effect on experimental 
results (Guillen and Veszteg, 2006).  Paying participants does mean that running 
experiments can become costly (and creates some interesting petty cash claims!), 
but it ensures that accurate data are produced.  Lessons about policy and market 
design are vastly cheaper when learned in the laboratory than through trial and error 
in the real world. 
KEY FINDINGS 
Market Performance and Design 
Vernon Smith’s first economic experiment was designed to test whether a simple 
auction mechanism (a double auction, in which both buyers and sellers can make 
bids) could match supply and demand (Smith, 1962).  The experiment showed that 
the market did indeed reach equilibrium, even though each trader knew only their 
own values, and so could not calculate the market clearing price.  At the time this 
was a surprise to many economists, who considered market equilibrium as more of 
an abstract concept than an empirical reality (Smith, 1987).  This is an important 
result, as the market equilibrium represents the point at which all potentially 
profitable trades have occurred, and so overall income is maximised.  This 
experiment showed that even a simple market mechanism could find this equilibrium.  
It also showed how this happened, with prices gradually converging towards the 
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equilibrium, and that the equilibrium does respond to changes in demand and 
supply.  
In terms of policy design, this experiment showed that markets may indeed be 
applied to efficiently allocate scarce resources.  However it is possible to go further, 
applying experimental techniques to directly compare alternative market designs.   
For example, another pioneering study compared an oral bid auction, in which 
buyers shout out bids and can change their bid if it is not accepted, with a posted bid 
auction in which buyers make a single bid which cannot be changed (Plott and 
Smith, 1978).  In order to compare the two markets, all other factors were kept 
constant in their experiments.  Buyers and sellers were given the same values, 
creating identical supply and demand functions in each experiment, and instructions 
which differed only in the details of the market organisation.  Overall performance, in 
terms of efficiency was high for both markets, but consistently higher in the oral bid 
auction than in the posted bid market. 
A market institution is the set of rules which specifies how the market is 
implemented, and how agents interact with each other – particularly the nature and 
timing of messages between agents.  In practical terms, it has become clear from 
experiments that details of the market institutions really matter in terms of market 
performance.  Small changes in market institution can make for big changes in 
market outcomes.  Some kinds of policy problems suit some kinds of institution 
better than others.  As described above, posted offer markets tend to converge more 
slowly and erratically, and are less efficient, than continuous double auctions.   
However there are also differences in transaction costs which mean that in many 
circumstances, posted offer is the preferred institution (Smith, 1994) – it is much 
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easier to post a price rather than engage in an auction for every trade.  Indeed, 
posted offer is by far the most common market institution in daily economic life.  
Experiments also reveal how some of the problems associated with markets 
may be mitigated.  For example price bubbles, which tend to be followed by crashes, 
result in poor investment decisions and can create problems for many market 
participants.  Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988) modified the basic double 
auction by turning the tradeable units into assets, which yield income over a finite 
number of periods.  In the experimental scenario, the units have a clear fundamental 
value based on the yield per period and the number of periods remaining.  However, 
there is a tendency for bubbles to occur, with prices rapidly rising during the initial 
periods in excess of fundamental value.  This is typically followed by a crash, in 
which prices often fall below fundamental value.  These results have been replicated 
under a variety of market structures, suggesting that bubbles and crashes are an 
inherent feature of human trading behaviour.  Even though the fundamental values 
are known to participants, they seem to have trouble predicting future declines in 
value.  Subsequent studies show that bubbles can be alleviated by incorporating a 
forward market, which provides better information about future prices (Porter and 
Smith, 1995). 
Markets are a valuable tool for environmental policy due to their ability to 
allocate resources efficiently, so enabling a target to be reached in the most cost 
effective way possible.  Markets are being widely applied to carbon and water use, 
and also have applications to other environmental issues such as biodiversity.   
Experimental economics can make a considerable contribution to the design of these 
markets.  For example, newly established markets are often characterised by price 
volatility.  This is often ignored by economic models, but can have a significant 
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impact on outcomes for market participants, and if many are forced out of the market 
the desired equilibrium may never be reached (Anderson and Sutinen, 2006).   
Experiments show that running an initial lease period, in which only temporary trades 
could be made, prior to a permanent trade market greatly reduced this volatility 
(Anderson and Sutinen, 2006).  Many water markets in Australia followed a similar 
evolution, which is likely to have facilitated a more orderly price discovery process. 
Social Preferences 
The rational actor paradigm of neoclassical economics assumes that people are 
motivated by material self-interest.  While this model is effective at predicting the 
behaviour of individuals in market settings, economic experiments have convincingly 
shown that it does not apply in many other circumstances.  For example, in the 
dictator game, an experimental subject is given an endowment, typically $10.  They 
then have the opportunity to transfer an amount to an anonymous partner.  There is 
no incentive for them to transfer anything, so a rational, materially self-interested 
individual should transfer nothing.  Experiments show that many people do make 
transfers – the mean is around $2, though the mode is typically zero (reviewed by 
Camerer, 2003).  This suggests that many experimental participants are motivated 
by social preferences such as altruism or a concern for fairness.  
The ultimatum game is similar, except the recipient has the option of rejecting 
the transfer, in which case both subjects receive nothing (Guth et al., 1982).  In this 
version, the mean offer is around $3-4, while the mode is $5.  The observation that 
offers are higher in the ultimatum game indicates that there is an element of strategy, 
in addition to any altruism. However, from an economic theory perspective, the real 
puzzle is the finding that recipients usually reject offers of less than $2 (Camerer, 
2003).  Rejecting any positive offer is costly, as the recipient will instead get nothing.  
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In the ultimatum game, as in many other economic experiments, perceptions of 
fairness are key, with people prepared to reject offers they consider unfair, even if it 
involves them receiving less than they otherwise might (Falk et al., 2003).  Other 
experiments show that people also respond positively to fair or generous offers (Berg 
et al., 1995).  Even in anonymous laboratory interactions, the majority of human 
subjects exhibit trust and reciprocity, contrary to the rational actor paradigm. 
The public goods game is an extensively studied economic experiment of 
particular relevance for those interested in environmental sustainability.  In the 
classic version of the experiment, four anonymous participants are endowed with 
$10 each, and then choose how much to contribute to a shared fund (the public 
good).  Contributions to the fund are doubled and then divided equally among the 
four participants, regardless of how much each contributed. The best possible 
outcome overall is for each to contribute the whole $10, resulting in $80 in the 
shared fund, and hence $20 each.  However, an individual participant will make 
more money if they keep their $10, in addition to their share of others’ contributions.  
This reflects many environmental issues, where the best outcomes are achieved if a 
group of people cooperate, but there is an incentive for individuals to free ride.  
A rational, materially self-interested economic agent will contribute nothing in 
the public goods game.  However, experiments show conclusively that most people 
deviate from this model.  Some contribute everything, some nothing; the average 
contribution in a one-off interaction is $4-6 (Ledyard, 1995).  This indicates that 
people are initially more cooperative than economic theory may predict.  However, if 
the game is played repeatedly, contributions decline towards zero over time 
(Ledyard, 1995).  Experiments show that face to face communication is effective at 
lifting, and maintaining, contributions to the public good, even though the incentive to 
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free ride remains (Ledyard, 1995; Ostrom, 2000; Zelmer, 2003).  Mechanisms for 
sanctioning free riders are very effective at maintaining cooperation, even if imposing 
sanctions is costly (Fehr and Gächter, 2000, 2002).  
Social preferences are consistently observed in a variety of settings, where 
they give rise to higher than anticipated levels of trust, reciprocity and cooperation.  
However they are fragile.  Economic experiments provide a method for exploring 
how social preferences are affected by institutions.  They demonstrate that under 
some rules and settings, cooperation flourishes to the benefit of all concerned, while 
in other circumstances people revert to selfish behaviour.  Such experiments are 
therefore well placed to contribute to research and policy for the management of 
environmental commons and public goods (Ostrom, 2006).  
Behavioural Anomalies 
There is a substantial body of evidence indicating that human psychology 
consistently deviates from many aspects of the rational actor paradigm.  Again this 
has significant implications for decision-making, and therefore the formulation of 
environmental policy.  One such example is risk aversion.  A fully rational economic 
agent is indifferent between $50 and a 50% chance of $100 or $0.  However most 
people are risk averse to some extent, and would prefer the certain $50.  Most would 
also prefer a certain $49 to the 50% chance of $100.  The degree of risk aversion 
varies between individuals (and some are risk seeking, preferring the riskier option 
with the higher payoff), and also between circumstances.  Individual risk attitudes 
can be estimated empirically using lottery choice experiments (Binswanger, 1980; 
Holt and Laury, 2002).  These experiments also show that risk aversion tends to 
increase with the size of the payoffs.  
11 Experimental Economics: Applications to Environmental Policy 
A series of studies by Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky and others has 
revealed a series of deviations from ‘rational’ decision making in the face of risk.  
Prospect theory considers outcomes in terms of gains and losses around their 
perceived starting point; the crucial aspect is change in value rather than the final 
value (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  This means that perceived losses and 
perceived gains are treated very differently.  In economic terms, a loss has a greater 
effect on utility than a gain, even when the amounts are identical.  This gives rise to 
loss aversion, with potential losses outweighing potential gains in the mind of the 
decision maker.  In a 50:50 gamble, the potential gain must be larger than the 
potential loss for a loss averse decision maker to accept the bet.  
According to prospect theory, the reference point from which an option is 
considered is crucial.  An option which is presented in terms of a choice between two 
potential gains will be considered differently from a choice between a potential loss 
and a potential gain.  Simply changing the way a decision is framed, even though the 
outcomes are materially identical, has a marked effect on outcomes (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1984).  Experiments demonstrate that even changing a single word in a 
description of a decision, to trigger a gain or a loss frame, significantly affects the 
proportion of people that choose each option (eg. De Martino et al., 2006).  This has 
important implications for the presentation of alternative choices in a wide variety of 
arenas.  Some of these effects have been intuitively understood long before they 
were formalised into a theory.  For instance, sales people present two different price 
rates as a normal rate with a potential discount rather then a normal rate with a 
potential surcharge (Thaler, 1980).  
Related to prospect theory is the endowment effect (Thaler, 1980), which 
states that people value things they already hold more than equivalent things they do 
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not have.  This means that the amount a person is willing to pay to acquire 
something tends to be less than the amount they would be willing to accept to part 
with it.  This can account for the disparity observed in environmental valuation 
studies between people’s willingness to pay for an additional ecosystem service and 
their willingness to accept compensation for the loss of an existing service (reviewed 
by Horowitz and McConnell, 2002).  These effects lead to status quo bias 
(Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988), in which potential losses that may result from 
making a change are given greater weighting than potential gains.  This means 
people may stick to the status quo, even if an alternative is expected to be beneficial.  
These behavioural ‘anomalies’ permeate all human decision-making, and have been 
advanced as explanations for everything from stock market prices (Benartzi and 
Thaler, 1995) to the continuation of the Iraq war (Kahneman and Renshon, 2007).  
Naturally they are also important and relevant to environmental policy. Experiments 
offer a valuable means to explore these effects, and to laboratory test human 
responses to proposed policy interventions.  
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY  
Experimental economics has been successfully applied to a wide range of problems, 
from designing auctions for mobile phone spectra (Klemperer, 2004) to allocating 
resources on space missions (Ledyard et al., 2000).  It also has great potential to 
directly inform environmental policy. The following examples describe applications of 
experimental methods to address real world policy issues.  
Designing Irrigation Reduction Auctions (Cummings et al., 2004) 
The state of Georgia in the USA implemented an auction mechanism to reduce 
irrigation water use during drought years.  In the auction, irrigators could offer to 
forego their entitlement for the season, in return for a payment.  (As individual water 
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use is not metered, it had to be all or nothing for each irrigation licence.)   
Experiments were run to test the ability of different auction institutions to efficiently 
and cost-effectively reduce irrigation.  A successful auction would reveal irrigators’ 
values for water, and ensure that those with the lowest values are the ones who sell 
their rights for the season.  In this way the market mechanism can deliver the 
environmental policy objective at the lowest overall cost to society.  Laboratory 
experiments compared uniform and discriminative price auctions, and tested the 
effects of announcing provisional winners or prices in the early stages of the auction.  
In addition to laboratory experiments with student participants, the authors 
also carried out ‘extension’ experiments, in which policy makers and irrigators took 
part.  This provided an opportunity to familiarise stakeholders with the auction 
mechanism prior to its implementation.  This experimental study was able to provide 
recommendations on auction design, having tested and compared a number of 
potential mechanisms.  The laboratory and field experiments ensured that the 
mechanism was robust, as well as being easy to take part in for inexperienced 
participants.  This ground-breaking study provides a useful model for the application 
of experimental methods to assist in both the design and implementation of 
environmental markets. 
Testing Pollution Permit Markets (Porter et al., 2009) 
Experimental methods were used to inform the design of an auction for tradeable 
pollution permits run by the Virginia State Government in the USA.  The Government 
sought an auction design that would maximise its revenue; this would also ensure 
that permits were allocated to the highest value users.  Economists identified two 
alternative auction formats which were likely to be acceptable to stakeholders, a 
traditional sealed bid and an ‘English clock’ mechanism.  The sealed bid requires 
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participants to indicate the price they are willing to pay and the maximum number of 
permits they are prepared to buy at that price.  Permits are sold to the highest 
bidders at the price they bid.  In the English clock, the price increases incrementally, 
with bidders indicating how many permits they wish to purchase at the current price.  
Under the English clock all successful buyers pay the same price.  In the sealed bid 
format, each successful buyer is likely to pay a different price.  This may lead some 
participants to bid less than they otherwise might, and so reduce overall revenues.  
On the other hand, the seller is able to get extra revenue from those who paid more 
than the lowest winning bid. 
A series of experiments were carried out to compare the alternative 
mechanisms.  Experimental participants took on the roles of buyers in the auction, 
and were given values for the permits they purchased.  These values varied between 
participants, just as they would between energy companies.  Little was known about 
the value of permits to the various energy companies, so each institution was tested 
with a series of different value sets.  The experimental results indicated that the 
English clock mechanism generated significantly higher revenues.  When the 
pollution permit auction went ahead, it adopted the English clock mechanism, and 
exceeded its revenue target by nearly 20% ($1.7 million).  In this example, there can 
be no way of knowing the outcome had the experimental findings not been applied.  
However when the cost of running such experiments is small compared to the 
revenue generated by the market, there is every chance that it will be a worthwhile 
investment. 
Designing Salinity Credit Trading Schemes in Australia (Connor et al., 2004) 
Experimental economics has been applied to the design of a cap and trade scheme 
intended to provide an efficient way of reducing the salt load in a sub-catchment of 
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the Murray River.  Two alternative mechanisms were tested – open call and closed 
call markets.  In closed call markets, buyers and sellers submit sealed bids and 
offers, and a clearing house calculates a single market clearing price, at which 
supply is equal to demand.  All bids to buy at or above this price are successful, as 
are offers to sell at or below the market clearing price.  Trades occur at the market 
clearing price, so the price is the same for all successful bidders.  Since the market 
is ‘closed’, only the market clearing price is announced, the actual bids and offers 
are not revealed.  By contrast in the open call institution, all bids and offers are made 
public.  The two institutions differ in the amount of information available to 
participants.  Theoretically they should give the same outcome, but in practice they 
may not. 
A simulated catchment was developed for the experiments, incorporating real 
biophysical data.  This catchment consisted of 12 farms with different income and 
recharge characteristics.  The results of the experiments showed that the market 
institutions delivered efficiency gains, compared to the alternative of regulation.  In 
the early periods of the experimental sessions, corresponding to the first few years of 
any market, gains tended to be somewhat less than predicted by economic 
modelling.  However as participants gained experience in the trading mechanism, 
overall gains from trade increased.  These experiments clearly demonstrated that the 
closed call market performs better than the open call in these circumstances.  With 
the closed call, the market tended to converge towards the equilibrium, where overall 
efficiency is maximised.  However in the open call, prices were more volatile, and did 
not converge so well to the equilibrium.  The authors suggest that the larger amounts 
of information in the open call market actually make it harder for people to work out a 
successful strategy.  These experiments therefore show that a cap and trade Market 
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Based Instrument (MBI) does have the potential to deliver efficiency gains in 
reducing recharge, and that a closed call market is preferred to an open call format 
in this instance. 
The Effects of Incentives on Voluntary Actions (Reeson and Tisdell 2008)  
Many people are prepared to volunteer time and money to improve the environment.  
In an era of increasing environmental regulations and incentives, it is important to 
understand how these policy interventions may impact on voluntary activity.  This 
was addressed experimentally using the public goods game described above.  In this 
game many people voluntarily contribute to the public good, even though they could 
make more money by not contributing.  These contributions are not motivated by any 
formal rewards or sanctions, so it is somewhat analogous to environmental 
volunteering.  According to economic theory, introducing an additional incentive for 
an activity can only lead to an increase in people’s willingness to supply it.  However, 
this may not be the case when people are motivated intrinsically, for instance by 
altruism, trust or fairness, rather than by extrinsic rewards (Frey, 1997).  
Laboratory experiments showed that being regulated ‘crowded out’ people’s 
intrinsic motivations to contribute to the public good.  People who had experienced a 
regulation specifying a minimum contribution to the public good contributed 
significantly less than those who had never been regulated.  Introducing a 
competitive market-like incentive for people to contribute also crowded out voluntary 
contributions.  People became less willing to contribute to the public good, even 
though they now had the opportunity to be paid for it.  By contrast, simply reminding 
people of the importance of contributing was effective at increasing average 
contributions.  These results indicate that introducing formal incentives for activities 
which people are already doing voluntarily can be fraught with danger.  In some 
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cases, overall outcomes may be reduced, even though additional resources are 
being invested.  Laboratory experiments are able to shed light on these issues, and 
assist in the design of policy interventions that ‘crowd in’, rather than crowd out, 
voluntary activity.  
CONCLUSIONS 
Successful management of social-ecological-economic systems requires, among 
many other things, an understanding of human behaviour.  Experimental economics 
can contribute to this, gathering empirical data on how people respond to incentives 
and policies.  The economics laboratory can be used to show if, and how, a 
proposed policy works.  They can also be used to compare alternative policies under 
a range of conditions.  Experiments have proved particularly useful in informing the 
design of environmental markets, where they have become an integral part of the 
policy design and implementation process.  They also provide valuable insights into 
both economic theory and human nature, which must be reconciled if sustainability is 
to become a reality. 
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